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1. INTRODUCTION 
In this article the local perspective of transitional justice is considered, thereby 
relying on a social-legal approach to study the aftermath of international crimes 
and human rights violations in transitional societies. In doing so I focus on the 
perspective of ordinary people on post-conflict reparations in the form of home 
restitution. My conclusions are based on a few published empirical studies about 
transitional justice institutions in the former Yugoslavia, but I also refer to 
perceptions about post-conflict reparations in Rwanda, Northern Uganda, South 
Africa, Chile, Colombia, Afghanistan and Iraq.1 
Why is this bottom-up approach? Because without understanding the local 
perspective transitional justice efforts lack legitimacy within society and this is 
crucial for the process as a whole. Hence empirical research on transitional justice 
and especially post-conflict reparations are deemed essential. The Secretary-
General of the United Nations in his report on transitional justice refers to the 
importance of the local perception in relation to legitimate structures to 
implement transitional justice, whereas Oomen takes the discussion a step further 
and specifically mentions the role of local perception in the process.2 To quote her 
“both, the normative assumptions and the empirical perceptions of legitimacy are 
                                                
1 ICTJ, When the War Ends: A Population Based Survey of Attitudes about Peace, Justice, and  
Social Reconstruction in Northern Uganda, New York, Human Rights Centre, University of 
Berkeley California/ International Centre for Transitional Justice, 2007; OHCHR, Making Peace 
Our Own: Victims' Perceptions of Accountability, Reconciliation and Transitional Justice in 
Northern Uganda, Geneva, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 
2007; UNDP, Public Perceptions on Transitional Justice; Report on Transitional Justice Opinion 
Polling Survey Conducted in April-May 2007 Kosovo, Kosovo, United Nations Development 
Programme, 2007; ICTJ, Colombian Perceptions and Opinions on Justice, Truth, Reparations, and 
Reconciliation. New York, International Centre for Transitional Justice, 2006; Kiza, E, Rathgeber, 
C. and Hölger-Rohne, C., Victims of War: An Empirical Study on War-Victimization and 
Victims’ Attitudes towards Addressing Atrocities, Freiburg, Max-Planck-Insitut für Ausländisches 
und International Strafrecht, 2006; AIHRC, A Call for Justice: A National Consultation on Past 
Human Rights Violations in Afghanistan, Kabul, Afghan Independent Human Rights 
Commission, 2005; ICTJ, Forgotten Voices: A Population Based Survey of Attitudes about Peace 
and Justice in Northern Uganda, New York, Human Rights Centre, University of Berkeley 
California/ International Centre for Transitional Justice, 2005; ICTJ, Iraqi Voices: Attitudes 
Towards Transitional Justice and Social Reconstruction, New York, Human Rights Centre, 
University of Berkeley California/ International Centre for Transitional Justice, 2004; Stover, E., 
and Weinstein, H. M. (eds), My Neighbor, My Enemy: Justice and Community in the Aftermath 
of Mass Atrocity, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004; Hayner, P. B., Unspeakable 
Truths, New York, Routledge, 2001; Gibson, J.L. and Macdonald, H., Truth–Yes, Reconciliation 
– Maybe: South Africans Judge the Truth and Reconciliation Process, Rondebosch, Research 
Report Institute for Justice and Reconciliation, 2001. 
2 Secretary-General of the United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General on the Rule of Law  
and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies. New York, United Nations 
Security Council, 2004, pp.3-4. 
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deemed important in working towards peace: the institutions have to be legitimate 
in moral terms, but the general public - in all its diversity - also have to perceive 
them as such.”3 Hence in addition to its many goals the transitional justice process 
attempts, after a period of lawlessness, to (re)create respect for the rule of law and 
institutions.4 Therefore understanding the view of ordinary people of transitional 
justice and how they perceive the actors involved is crucial. 
Primarily I discuss the local perspective of transitional justice institutions 
without specifically focussing on the victims’ perspective. In the first two sections 
of this article I discuss the concepts of transitional justice and transitional justice 
institutions. Then several empirical studies on the local perspective of post-
conflict reparations are reviewed. There is a special focus on the former 
Yugoslavia. In the end I reflect upon the legitimacy of post-conflict reparations 
and the role of international community in transitional contexts. 
2. TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE  
There are numerous definitions of transitional justice. Some focus on the 
normative approach of international law and political transition towards 
democracy. Others are broader and concern the dilemmas, types of mechanisms 
and practices of the process of transitional justice.5 Roht-Arriaza and 
Mariezcurrena define transitional justice as “that set of practices, mechanisms and 
concerns that arise following a period of conflict, civil strife or repression, and 
that are aimed directly at confronting and dealing with past violations of human 
rights and humanitarian law.”6 Their definition stresses that the process is 
extraordinary and serves multiple goals. These may include justice or 
accountability, social reconstruction, reconciliation, truth-finding and lasting 
peace.  
During the 1980s and 1990s justice and truth were often presented as two 
separate goals of the process. Now, however, there is growing consensus that the 
                                                
3 Oomen, B., Justice  Mechanisms and the Question of Legitimacy: The Example of Rwanda's 
Multi-Layered Justice Mechanisms, Bern, FriEnt, the Working Group on Development and Peace/ 
KOFF, 2007, pp.5; Oomen, B., ‘Transitional Justice and its Legitimacy: the Case for a Local 
Perspective’, Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, Vol.25, No.2, 2007, pp.41-48. 
4 Bell, C., Campbell, C.,  and Ni Aloain, F, ‘Justice Discourse in Transition’, Social & Legal  
Studies, Vol. 13, No.3, 2004, pp.305-328. 
5 See, for example, Secretary-General of the United Nations op.cit. (note 2), p.4; Teitel, R.G.,  
Transitional Justice, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000, pp.3-6. 
6 Roht-Arriaza, N., ‘The New Landscape of Transitional Justice’, in: Roht-Arriaza, N., and 
Mariezcurrena, J. (eds), Transitional Justice in the Twenty-First Century: Beyond Truth versus 
Justice, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006, pp.2. 
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former does not necessarily exclude the latter.7 Therefore the objective of 
implementing the process of transitional justice is a combination of justice, truth 
and social reconstruction. One explanation for this development is that in 
comparison to two decennia ago, when transitional justice processes were set in 
motion in post-authoritarian societies, a lot has changed. For instance, the Cold 
War has ended. In the 1980s democratic transition in Latin America and in 
Eastern Europe was mostly set in motion by internal pressure. Authoritarian 
leaders such as General Pinochet in Chile gave up their absolute political control 
without losing all their influence. Additionally many enjoyed amnesties or non-
prosecution guarantees. Since the 1990s the transitional justice debate 
increasingly affects post-conflict societies where rivalling parties after a truce or 
peace accord share political power or the military influence of third countries is 
persistent. Amongst others these post-conflict societies include Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Iraq, Afghanistan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In 
these types of post-conflict societies the peace is fragile and attempts to hold 
powerful groups accountable carry a risk of political upheaval and 
destabilisation.8  
Furthermore, as every post-conflict- and post-authoritarian context has its 
own logic it is important to recognise that the content and form of a transitional 
justice process is based upon political negotiation and compromise, is developed 
ad hoc and is to a certain extent symbolic. Even though the Secretary-General of 
the United Nations recognises that transitional justice plans should be holistic, not 
static and that during different phases different institutions and processes should 
enjoy the priority, in practise these objectives remain challenging.9 For instance, a 
continuance of a lack of the rule of law is destabilising transitional justice 
initiatives.10 Therefore the process of transitional justice needs to be linked to 
judicial and security reform. Also socio-economic - and political factors play a 
tremendous role. By recognising the national - and local dimension to rebuilding a 
society in transition one might be able to influence efforts to reconcile and 
socially reconstruct communities.11  
                                                
7 Lutz, E. ‘Transitional Justice: Lessons Learned and the Road Ahead’, in: Roht-Arriaza, N., and 
Mariezcurrena, J. (eds), Transitional Justice in the Twenty-First Century: Beyond Truth versus 
Justice, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006, pp. 327-329; Roht-Arriaza op.cit. (note 6), 
pp.7-8. 
8 Bosire, L., Overpromised, Underdelivered: Transitional Justice in Sub-Saharan Africa, New 
York, International Transitional Justice Centre, 2006. 
9 Secretary-General of the United Nations op.cit. (note 2), p.32. 
10 Voorhoeve, J., From War to the Rule of Law: Peace Building after Violent Conflict, 
Amsterdam, Amsterdam University Press, 2007. 
11 Roht-Arriaza op.cit. (note 6), pp.4-5. 
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3. POST-CONFLICT REPARATIONS: ONE OF MANY TRANSITIONAL 
JUSTICE INSTITUTIONS 
In a post-conflict context there is a combination of transitional justice efforts 
which in practice are being implemented ad hoc and during different timeframes. 
There is a narrow- and broad approach to identifying types of transitional justice 
institutions, practices and dilemmas.12 The narrow approach usually consists of 
criminal accountability mechanisms, material - and non-material reparations, 
institutional reform, truth-seeking commissions and amnesty procedures. Whereas 
the broad approach is believed to include not only the former, but also 
demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration (‘DDR’) programmes for former 
combatants, traditional practices, searching for clandestine burial sites, identifying 
victims, realising prisoners, formal apologies by the state, psycho-social support, 
legal reform, developing educational curricula, creating memorial sites and 
dealing with structural causes of the conflict. (Inter) national actors tend to favour 
a combination of several transitional justice institutions, which mostly reflect the 
narrow approach. This does not necessarily mean that other initiatives such as 
educational reform are not supported, but they are not considered to be linked 
directly to the transitional justice process.  
Below, I consider the narrow approach in relation to the former 
Yugoslavia and especially Bosnia and Herzegovina.13 In this region of the world 
individual criminal accountability has been implemented through several 
institutions including the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
(‘ICTY’), hybrid tribunals like the Bosnian War Crimes Chamber and domestic 
prosecutions by district courts. Institutional reform has occurred by vetting and 
discharging public officials, members of security forces such as generals who 
have a war crimes record, and contemporary politicians, who failed to live up to 
the requirements such as enforcing property laws. Efforts to initiate a truth 
commission are still debated. Only the governments of Serbia, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and some NGO’s have considered the possibility of establishing 
national commissions. For different reasons there is local opposition. Even though 
there are no formal amnesty laws, de facto many war criminal and human rights 
violators enjoy immunity. In general the objective of post-conflict reparations is 
to remedy past harms, but more specifically the reasons are to recognise the 
suffering of the victim, accountability by the state or other groups, an expression 
of social solidarity. Even though it is more the exception than the rule that 
reparation for victims in a transitional context is provided, they are an important 
transitional justice mechanism. Post-conflict reparations are both material - and 
                                                
12 Lutz op.cit.  (note 7); Secretary-General of the United Nations op.cit. (note 2), p.4. 
13 UNDP, Transitional Justice; Assessment Survey of Conditions in the Former Yugoslavia, 
Belgrade, United Nations Development Programme, 2006. 
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non-material and enjoy an individual - or collective character. They can entail full 
restitution, compensation, formal apologies, rehabilitation and guarantees of non-
repetition.14 Furthermore, there is the question to whom the victims should direct 
their request: the state, the local government, private actors, the perpetrators or the 
international community? 
International- and or national actors tend to create a special fund, 
legislation, strategies or programmes to ensure post-conflict reparations. 
Sometimes they are part of peace agreements at others they are the result of 
democratic political-decision making or private initiatives. In Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, for instance, home restitution, compensation or reconstruction was 
part of the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement, of the Constitution and the 1998 
property laws.15 Initially the Commission for Displaced Persons and Refugees 
was mandated to handle the restitution claims and a few years later a special 
strategy was designed to facilitate a more effective implementation.16 The strategy 
was called the Property Law Implementation Plan and involved increased 
coordination and monitoring of the property laws.17 This development indicates 
that post-conflict reparations tend to be developed ad hoc. In practice there is little 
coordination and cooperation with other transitional justice institutions initiated 
by the national- or local government, international donors or civil society.  
In the particular case of Bosnia and Herzegovina there was a lot of internal 
political and administrative resistance, public ignorance and pre-war 
documentation on home ownership or occupancy rights was missing. Therefore 
during consecutive periods new mechanisms were designed to facilitate the 
process of providing post-conflict reparations. For instance, at the local level 
people were not really aware of the possibility to reclaim their home. Only by 
initiating other transitional justice efforts like public campaigns, did Bosnians 
become more aware of claiming reparations. Also they experienced the difference 
between the theory and practice of implementing transitional justice. As Buyse in 
his book pleads for flexibility in the housing restitution process, he recognises that 
transitional justice processes, and probably also the perception of local 
                                                
14 United Nations General Assembly, 'Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy 
and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law', 16 December 2005. Also known as the ‘Van 
Boven/Bassiouni Principles’. 
15 Annex 4, 6 and 7 of the Dayton Peace Agreement, ‘The General Framework Agreement for 
Peace in Bosnia Herzegovina’, Paris: 14 December 1995 (‘Dayton Peace Agreement’); article 
II(3) Constitution, ‘Constitution of Bosnia Herzegovina’, 1 December 1995. 
16 Later this commission was referred to as the ‘Commission for Real Property Claims of 
Displaced Persons and Refugees’. Annex 7 Dayton Peace Agreement. 
17 Buyse, A., Post-Conflict Housing Restitution: The European Human Rights Perspective, with  
a Case Study on Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brussels/ Oxford, Intersentia, 2008, pp.324-333; 
UNDP, 2006, op.cit. (note 13), pp.145-147. 
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stakeholders, changes over time.18 These additional efforts to secure the 
implementation of post-conflict reparations proved to be somewhat successful. 
Because even though in the late 1990s very few properties were returned to their 
pre-conflict owners and in 2000 only 21% of the 200.000 properties that were 
subject to a claim under the property laws had been returned, in 2005 this was 
93.34%.19 Yet according to human rights organisations less than half of refugees 
who actually reposed their pre-war homes returned to live there permanently.20
Therefore even though most resources for this transitional justice effort were 
spend on home restitution, compensation for property loss became the real 
success.21 Hence what is unique about Bosnia and Herzegovina is that this 
transitional justice effort had a basis in the law and enjoyed strong international 
political support. This situation is exceptional for any a particular form of post-
conflict reparations.  
In many post-conflicts society’s reparations are not a priority. To some 
extent this is related to the context. Has the country been affected by the conflict? 
Is it in a developing phase or perhaps a failed state? In comparison to other post-
conflict situation like Northern Uganda necessities and possibilities in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina differ. In a recent report by the Office of the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights on Northern Uganda respondents explained how they understood 
reparations, which in addition to truth-telling was identified as the primary 
favoured form of transitional justice:  
Compensation should be given as repayment for the harm caused 
in the form of cows. (A male youth -Amuria District, Teso).22 
The Government needs to compensate victims of abductions, 
lootings and killings. The UN needs to help out in this area….. 
Uganda is a developing country. Compensation needs to be 
decided on a case-by-case basis…. But some of our property was 
not registered, for example our lands had no land titles, so 
compensation may be hard to claim. There is a need for the 
international community to come in, especially because they have 
sent missions that have witnessed the destruction that has taken 
place. Such help should not come through the Government; 
                                                
18 Buyse op.cit. (note 17), pp.363-364. 
19 UNDP, 2006, op.cit. (note 13), pp.145-147. 
20 HRW (2005). World Report: Bosnia Herzegovina, Human Rights Watch, on the website of 
Human Rights Watch http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/01/18/bosher12238.htm on 18 May 2008; 
BHCHR (2005), Report on the Status of Human Rights in Bosnia Herzegovina, accessed on the 
website of the Bosnian Helsinki Committee for Human Rights, http://www.bh-
hchr.org/Reports/reportHR2005.htm on 20 June 2008. 
21 Buyse op.cit. (note 17), pp.342. 
22 OHCHR, 2007, op.cit. (note 1), pp.58-59.   
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otherwise it will not reach the beneficiaries. (A former male 
abductee - Lira District, Lango).23 
These two quotes suggest that local people have their own ideas about what kind 
of reparations would be appropriate. Furthermore, the second interviewee 
comments on local complexities in returning property and the role of the 
international community (see section 6). In Northern-Uganda home restitution is 
difficult, because whole communities have been uprooted and villages destroyed. 
Therefore the type of post-conflict reparations and how they are implemented 
relies heavily on the local context and available resources.  
Moreover another aspect is political power. Who in a post-conflict context 
runs the country: one or more of the warring parties, external forces or elected 
politicians? For instance, Rwanda is a post-conflict society where unlike Bosnia 
and Herzegovina one of the parties, who participated in the conflict, is in charge. 
Transitional justice is implemented one sided. For example, the local Gacaca24
courts allow for request for reparations on the basis of community service by the 
convicted as well as individual claims, which are determined by the lay judges 
according to a legal schedule and then forwarded to a compensation fund.25 Yet as 
for political reasons only Hutu perpetrators are held accountable, predominantly 
Tutsi victims of the genocide and not the Hutu victims of crimes against humanity 
issue claims. Therefore the socio-political and the local context of post-conflict 
societies must be taken into account in the design of any reparations scheme. 
                                                
23 Idem. 
24 In March 2005 the local Gacaca courts, which deal with low level perpetrators of genocide at 
the community level, were inaugurated. Between July 2005 and February 2007 71.405 suspects, 
who confessed (this is one of the requirements) were convicted. See Longman, T., ‘Justice at the  
Grassroots: Gacaca Trials in Rwanda’, in: Roht-Arriaza, N., and Mariezcurrena, J. (eds)’, 
Transitional Justice in the Twenty-First Century: Beyond Truth versus Justice, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, pp.206-229; Des Forges, A., and Longman, T., ‘Legal Responses to 
Genocide in Rwanda’, in: E. Stover and H. M. Weinstein (eds). My Neighbor My Enemy: Justice 
and Community in the Aftermath of Mass Atrocity, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
pp.49-68; Karekezi, U. A., Nshimiyimana, A., and Mutamba, B., ’Localizing Justice: Gacaca 
Courts in Post-Genocide Rwanda’, in: E. Stover and H. M. Weinstein (eds), My Neighbor My 
Enemy: Justice and Community in the Aftermath of Mass Atrocity, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2004, pp.69-85. 
25 Longman, T., and Rutagengwa, T., ‘Memory, Identity, and Community in Rwanda’, in: Stover, 
E., and Weinstein, H. M. (eds), My Neighbor, My Enemy: Justice an Community in The 
Aftermath of Mass Atrocity, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004, pp.173-175; Roth-
Arriaza, N., ‘Reparations in the Aftermath of Repression’ in Stover, E., and Weinstein, H. M. 
(eds), My Neighbor, My Enemy: Justice an Community in The Aftermath of Mass Atrocity, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp.132-133. 
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4. THE LOCAL PERSPECTIVE ON POST-CONFLICT REPARATIONS 
For the neighbours of displaced ethnic minorities in Bosnia Herzegovina, post-
conflict reparations, such as the restoration of property rights are a mixed bag.26
This while for war victims the restoration of property rights are both a material - 
and a moral recognition of their suffering.27 By being able to - lawfully - return to 
one’s home or receive compensation, individual suffering is acknowledged. 
Maybe victims feel rehabilitated and are able to reclaim bits of their former life. 
In addition, restoration of property rights is about state recognition of individual 
suffering. Yet, do communities at large recognise displaced minorities as victims? 
Do they feel that they should be eligible for post-conflict reparations and if so in 
what form? Because the process of transitional justice is broader than justice for 
victims at the individual level, it is important to consider local perspectives on 
post-conflict reparations. These are likely to influence reconciliation, perception 
of justice and social reconstruction at the community level.  
At the abstract level, local people strongly support material compensation 
for war victims. For instance, a 2007 survey conducted by the United Nations 
Development Programme in Kosovo, showed that not only a vast majority of 
respondents supported material compensation, but that there were no dramatic 
differences in opinion amongst Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs.28
Widespread support was also reported in Afghanistan, Iraq, Colombia and 
Northern Uganda.29 This suggests that post-conflict reparations are a form of 
transitional justice that could potentially contribute to justice, reconciliation, 
social reconstruction or lasting peace. 
However, in one’s own community perception is not always concurrent 
with what people believe at the abstract level. Amongst others it is influenced by 
personal war experiences and perception may change over time. In multi-ethnic 
post-conflict communities like Vukovar, Mostar and Prijedor in Croatia and in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina there is a strong sense of nationalism and denial about 
                                                
26 For instance, the European Court of Human Rights ruled in the Krtina Blečić versus Croatia 
case that because of temporal jurisdiction they could not reverse the decisions of the domestic 
court, who denied her claim to her property rights. The case reflects the thousands of tenants and 
house owners who during the civil war in the 1990s in the former Yugoslavia had lost their 
occupancy rights. The majority of victims of property loss are ethnic minorities (ECTHR, Krtina 
Blečić versus Croatia (partial decision on admissibility), 29 September 2000 (Appl.no.59532/00). 
See Buyse op.cit. (note 17), pp.3-4; UNDP, 2006, op.cit. (note 13), pp.145-152.  
27 Roth-Arriaza, N. op.cit. (note 25). 
28 78% agree and 18% partly agree. See UNDP, 2007, op.cit. (note 1), pp.29-30. 
29 AIHRC, (note 1), pp. 32-34; ICTJ, 2007, op.cit. (note 1), pp. 34-35; ICTJ, 2006, (note 1), pp. 
43-44; ICTJ, 2004, op.cit. (note 1), pp.40-43.  
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the involvement of one’s own ethnic group in ethnic cleansing.30 Therefore in 
these kinds of localities inhabitants and politicians are not likely to recognise that 
ethnic minorities were forced to leave their homes during the war or are unable to 
return. Thereby finding it difficult to take collective responsibility for what has 
been done to victims.31 Even though by now most property claims have been 
settled, communities in the former Yugoslavia remain ethnically divided. On 
average only a small number of the pre-war population has returned to their 
former home.32 For these reasons one can question to what extent post-conflict 
reparations contribute to feelings of justice, social reconstruction at the 
community level or reconciliation. These goals of the transitional justice process 
are probably only achieved in combination with other transitional justice 
institutions. 
To some extent everybody in a post-conflict society is (or feels) 
victimised. In a 2005 survey by the Afghan Independent Human Rights 
Commission, a considerable majority of the respondents stated that they have 
suffered from a human rights violation during the last two decades.33 To quote 
this respondent from Kandahar “All the people of Afghanistan were the victims of 
atrocities and there is no family that has not experienced a death or disability.”34
Subsequently there is a risk of creating animosities between those who receive 
post-conflict reparations and those who did not. This happened in Chile and in 
South Africa were reparations that were handed out after the reports of the 
respective Truth and Reconciliation Commissions created tension at the 
community level.35 The primary cause being that some victims were denied 
victims status and therefore did not receive compensation. 
                                                
30 Biro, M., Ajdukovic, D., Corkalo, D., Djipa, D., Milin, P. and Weinstein, H. T., ‘Justice and 
Social  
Reconstruction in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia’, in: Stover, E., and Weinstein, H. M. 
(eds), My Neighbor, My Enemy: Justice and Community in The Aftermath of Mass Atrocity, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004, pp.192-195. 
31 Stover, E., and Weinstein, H. M. (eds). (2004). My Neighbor, My Enemy: Justice an 
Community in The Aftermath of Mass Atrocity. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
32 HRW, World Report 2005: Bosnia Herzegovina, Human Rights Watch, on the website of 
Human Rights Watch http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/01/18/bosher12238.htm on 18 May 2008; 
BHCHR, Report on the Status of Human Rights in Bosnia Herzegovina, 2005, accessed on the 
website of the Bosnian Helsinki Committee for Human Rights, http://www.bh-
hchr.org/Reports/reportHR2005.htm on 20 June 2008. 
33 69% identified themselves or a close relative as a victim of a human rights violation. See  
AIHRC, (note 1), pp. pp. 8-11. 
34 Ibidem (note 1), pp. 33. 
35 Lira, E., ‘The Reparations Policy for Human Rights Violations in Chile’, in: Greiff, P. (ed).  
The Handbook of Reparation, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006; Roth-Arriaza, N. op.cit. 
(note 25), pp.130; Hayner, P. B., Unspeakable Truths, New York, Routledge, 2001, pp.178-181/ 
328-329.  
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Furthermore, local opinion is partly influenced by the question: who 
should be responsible for executing post-conflict reparations? In general 
communities feel that the state, sometimes supported by the international 
community, has to be in charge. In surveys in Iraq and Colombia the majority of 
respondents indicate that the state should carry the burden.36 Yet when there is a 
risk that communities or individuals themselves have to compensate victims their 
view might be less supportive. Research in Rwanda shows that Tutsi genocide 
victims tended to be more positive about reparations as a form of transitional 
justice than Hutu’s respondents.37 This could suggest that Hutu’s are fearful on 
the burden that post-conflict reparations might place on them. Subsequently post-
conflict reparations in a post-conflict society could potentially also negatively 
affect the process of transitional justice. 
5. LOCAL LEGITIMACY AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY  
As the goals of transitional justice are broader than primarily doing justice and 
serving the needs of victims of human rights violations and war crimes, it is vital 
that the extraordinary efforts to implement the process is experienced as 
legitimate by post-conflict communities. In relation to the aforementioned 
example of Rwanda, one could argue that Hutu respondents are likely to perceive 
post-conflict reparations and especially community service as illegitimate.38
Thereby the transitional justice process as a whole runs the risk of not meeting 
goals like reconciliation and social reconstruction. Furthermore, in the case of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina’s post-conflict reparations the international community 
played an exceptional role. Subsequently local perception of their involvement 
should be considered.   
Obviously resistance at the local level influences perceptions of 
legitimacy. Also it is likely to vary among different groups of people and subject 
to change over time. For instance, even though in a 2001 survey by the Institute 
for Justice and Reconciliation the majority of South Africans state that they 
support reparations by the government for human rights violations committed 
during the apartheid regime, there are different views on who should carry the 
burden.39 Black South Africans are more likely to hold a variety of institutions 
and groups responsible, whereas white South Africans predominantly feel the 
government should pay.40 One can only guess whether the outcome of this 
                                                
36 ICTJ, 2006, pp.44-45; ICTJ, 2004, pp.42-43.  
37 Longman and Rutagengwa op.cit. (note 25), pp.173-175. 
38 Idem; Roth-Arriaza, N. op.cit. (note 25), pp.132-133. 
39 Gibson and Macdonald op.cit. (note 1), pp.8-10/24-27. 
40 Idem. Actually the survey distinguished between four groups of South Africans: Blacks, Whites,  
Coloured and Asians. On average black South Africans felt that 9 different institutions or groups  
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research would have been similar in the early 1990s when the apartheid regime 
was abolished. This kind of information could assist (inter)national actors in 
drafting post-conflict reparations that are perceived as legitimate by a broad 
section of society.  
Some actors attempt to deal with local resistance by allocating post-
conflict reparations as part of community development. In this approach not only 
the victims but also their neighbours benefit, thereby diminishing the chances for 
local discontent. For instance, in 2005 the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
ruled that Suriname had to ensure that the victims of human rights violations 
committed in 1986 in the Moiwana village received individual material and non-
material reparations, but that also a development fund for housing, health and 
educational programs for the community was to be created.41 In general, however, 
victims tend to feel that the collective reparations have more in common with 
development projects than accountability for past harms.42 What is especially 
problematic is that the distinction between who is a victim and who is not blurs.43
Therefore collective post-conflict reparations should strike a balance between 
community needs and individual recognition of suffering. 
Post-conflict reparations became more effective in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina when local legitimacy of this transitional justice effort was taken 
more seriously by the (inter)national actors involved. For example, part of the 
strategy of the Property Law Implementation Plan was to first deal with 
restitution in cases where the occupiers of the house were living on more than one 
address (see section 3).44 Subsequently when these residents were evicted they 
had another place to live. This sort of measures attempted to influence popular 
approval. Nonetheless, one of the reasons that despite these efforts many people 
did not return to their pre-war home was that there was a lack of economic, social 
and political opportunities.45 This signifies the need for a holistic and integrated 
approach to transitional justice. 
                                                                                                                                     
should pay, whereas for white South Africans this was 2.2, for South Africans of Asian decent 4.9 
and for coloured South Africans 3.5.  
41 On 29 November 1986 a military operation was conducted in Moiwana Village. State agents 
and others killed 39 villagers and wounded many others. Furthermore, property was destroyed and 
survivors were forced to flee. See Intern-American Court of Human Rights, Case of Moiwana 
Village versus Suriname (ser. C) No. 124, at 1. Judgement 15 June 15, 2005, paragraphs 186-218. 
42 Roth-Arriaza, N. op.cit. (note 25), pp. 129-136. 
43 OHCHR (2008). Rule of Law Tools for Post-Conflict States: Reparations Programmes, Geneva, 
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, pp.25-27. 
44 Buyse op.cit. (note 17), pp.324-333. 
45 Kälin, W., Specific Groups and Individuals: Mass Exodus and Displaced Persons: Report of the 
Representative of the Secretary-General on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Person, 
Report of the Representative of the Secretary-General on the Human Rights of Internally 
Displaced Persons, Addendum: Mission to Bosnia Herzegovina, Un Doc.E/CN.4/2006/71/Add.4, 
2006. 
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One of the reasons that post-conflict reparations in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina were a success was that the international community was committed 
to home restitution. However the level of involvement of the United Nations and 
the European Union in this post-conflict state, which is not yet fully sovereign, is 
exceptional and often times their legitimacy is questioned by Bosnians.46 For 
instance, the High Representative as appointed by the United Nations used his far 
reaching powers to make sure post-conflict reparations were executed.47 This 
meant that not only laws were redrafted but also that public officials and 
politicians who obstructed the process were removed. Buyse in his book pleads 
for ensuring impartiality by temporarily including international elements at the 
highest levels of restitution and human rights adjudicatory institutions: my 
question is whether these international elements enjoy legitimacy at the local 
level? 48  
Even though the rule based approach of the restoration of property rights 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina was successful, I am not sure whether the involvement 
of the international community was perceived as more legitimate than that of the 
local authorities. Is it just to remove politicians who have been elected in 
democratic elections?49 In comparison, consider the local perception of 
international involvement in prosecuting international crimes and human rights 
violations. As several other studies have shown, a 2000 and 2001 study in 
Vukovar, Mostar and Prijedor indicated that the ICTY is resented in the former 
Yugoslavia: Croats and Serbs feel that only their ethnic groups are persecuted and 
Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims) feel that not enough perpetrators are prosecuted.50
These opinions question the role of the international community in transitional 
justice institutions. Furthermore, in order to assess the perception about the 
legitimacy of the international community, one has to take into account their role 
before, during and after the war. For example, even though the international 
community ended the conflict, many Bosnians continue to harbour negative 
feelings.51 For these reasons I am curious how Bosnians would evaluate the role 
of the international community in post-conflict reparations?  
                                                
46 Stewart, A., ‘The International Community in Bosnia: Enduring Questions of Legitimacy’, 
Chinese Journal of International Law, Vol.5, No.3, 2006, pp.753-760. 
47 Office of the High Representative, PIC Bonn Conclusions, 10 December 1997; Annex 10 of the 
Dayton Peace Agreement (1995), ‘The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia 
Herzegovina’, Paris: 14 December 1995 (‘Dayton Peace Agreement’). 
48 Buyse op.cit. (note 17), pp.364. 
49 Stewart, A. (2006), ‘The International Community in Bosnia: Enduring Questions of 
Legitimacy’, Chinese Journal of International Law, Vol.5, No.3, pp.758-759. 
50 Biro et al. op.cit. (note 30), pp.192-195. See also UNDP, 2006, op.cit. (note 13), pp.64-65. 
51 Stewart op.cit. (note 49), pp.755; Fletcher, L.E. and Stover, E., ‘A World Unto Itself? The 
Application of Justice in the Former Yugoslavia’ in Stover, E., & Weinstein, H. M. (eds), My 
Neighbor, My Enemy: Justice and Community in The Aftermath of Mass Atrocity, Cambridge, 
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Last but not least, more than a decade after the conflict Bosnia and 
Herzegovina continues to be an ethnically divided state, where in towns like 
Vukovar or Sarajevo people live segregated. The former United Nations High 
Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Lord Paddy Ashdown, was quoted as 
saying that the state itself is on the verge of collapse.52 As de facto Bosnian 
Croats, Bosniaks and Bosnian Serb are politically and socially separated, it is 
difficult to maintain that transitional justice efforts such as post-conflict 
reparations have significantly contributed to reconciliation and social 
reconstruction at the community level. This indicates that even if there was 
empirical data supporting that post-conflict reparations enjoyed legitimacy at the 
local level, their influence on and the role of the international community in the 
process of transitional justice as a whole can be questioned.  
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS  
By focussing on the local perspective on transitional justice, I have analysed post-
conflict reparations in the form of house restitution in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
Even though the context of post-conflict societies in Europe, Latin America, 
Africa and Asia differ and there is no one-size-fits-all approach to reparations, 
some general lessons can be learned from the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The most important ones being that local legitimacy is a crucial element to the 
transitional justice process and that the role of the international community in a 
post-conflict context is more ambiguous than is sometimes assumed. In other 
words people have to perceive transitional justice institutes as well as the actors 
involved in the process as legitimate.  
 In Bosnia and Herzegovina particular goals of transitional justice such as 
‘legal’ justice have received more attention than reconciliation and social 
reconstruction. On an individual level the rule based approach of post-conflict 
reparations has been successful and perhaps to some extent enjoys local 
legitimacy. Many victims have been to reclaim their property, reinstitute their 
occupancy rights or receive compensation. Yet it appears as if at the community 
level post-conflict reparations have been less successful in contributing towards 
reconciliation, the social reconstruction of communities or lasting peace. Despite 
the strong international pressure to implement transitional justice in the form of 
post-conflict reparations Bosnians continue to live segregated.  
                                                                                                                                     
Cambridge University Press, 2004, pp.31-33/ 40-41; Stover, E., and Weinstein, H.M. , 
‘Conclusion: A Common Objective, A Universe of Alternatives’ in: Stover, E., and Weinstein, H.  
M. (eds), My Neighbor, My Enemy: Justice and Community in The Aftermath of Mass Atrocity. 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004, pp.326.     
52 The Observer (2008), ‘Europe Needs a Wake-Up Call: Bosnia is on the Edge Again’, 27 July 
2008. 
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